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THE LAW AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES,
by J.B. RuhL, Steven E. Kraft & Christopher L. Lant1
"Goods, Services, and Systems"
BRUCE PARDY 2
ECOSYSTEMS PROVIDE SERVICES on which human beings depend. However,
those services do not have market value because the law does not recognize
property interests in them, and consequently there is little incentive to produce or
preserve them. Nor does environmental regulation effectively protect ecosystem
services. The authors of The Law and Policy of Ecosystem Services examine the law's
failure to address the progressive decline in ecosystem services and what might be
done to fix it. The book provides a welcome diagnosis of present shortcomings
but a less satisfying prescription for the evolution of environmental law.
I. MARKETS AND ECOSYSTEMS
In a market, one can purchase goods and services: apples, haircuts, houses, and
furnace repairs. But a market is itself neither a good nor a service, nor merely a
place where goods and services are found. Instead, a market is a system-an
intricate, unplanned agglomeration of multiple buyers and sellers of diverse
goods and services, in which choice, supply, demand, and price are determined
by mechanisms within the system rather than by any particular market
participant.3 The market reflects the aggregate results of many decisions made
by multiple producers and consumers. In this respect, markets self-regulate.
1. (Washington: Island Press, 2007) 360 pages.
2. Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Queen's University. Comments are welcome at
pardyb@queensu.ca.
3. Assuming that barriers to entry and transaction costs are relatively low, and the market
is competitive.
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They create incentives to produce goods and services for which there are buyers,
which in turn create incentives to preserve the assets that produce those goods
and services. If golden eggs are valuable, best not kill the goose. Conversely, if
there is no market for golden eggs, may as well have goose for dinner.
Ecosystems, as the word suggests, are systems too. Instead of goods,
services, buyers, and sellers, the elements of ecosystems are plants, animals,
minerals, water, air, chemicals, nutrients, and so on. Just as a market is not
merely goods and services, or the place where goods and services are exchanged,
ecosystems are not merely plants and animals, or the place where plants and
animals live. Rather, ecosystems are patterns of interactions between
constituent elements and the mechanisms by which they relate. Like markets,
ecosystems self-regulate. Through the interaction of various agents, they
produce solutions to ecological problems. For example, predator
overpopulation results in the over-consumption of prey, which in turn results
in a lack of food, which causes death through starvation and leads to a decrease
in the predator population, which allows the population of prey to increase,
which in turn results in more food, which ultimately allows predator
populations to increase. And so on, in an infinite variety of circumstances.
II. ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
Human beings depend on the goods and services provided by these two
systems. Market transactions provide labour, food, shelter, consumer goods,
and other needs and wants. Ecosystems provide "ecosystem services" (ES) like
air and water purification, soil generation, climate stabilization, photosynthesis,
pollination, and waste decomposition among other things. Human beings and
their markets require ES, but those services in the main do not constitute goods
and services within those markets. Markets cannot.deal in ES because the law
does not recognize that they exist.
Thus, ES are simultaneously priceless and valueless-priceless because
human beings cannot survive without them; valueless because they cannot be
bought and sold. Therefore, there is no economic incentive to produce or
preserve these assets. Ruhl, Kraft, and Lant state in their introduction:
Ecosystem services are easy to take for granted until they are gone. As in the famous
paradox of value that long puzzled economists, they have been more like water-
essential for life, but so widely available they are easily obtained for free-than like
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diamonds, which are scarce and thus valuable despite having little practical use. But
water in many parts of our nation is no longer so plentiful or so cheap.4
III. THE LAW AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
The failure of environmental law and policy to address this conundrum is the topic
of The Law and Policy of Ecosystem Services. The book outlines the obstacles to the
legal recognition and protection of ES and endeavours "to evaluate the prospects of
crafting a legal infrastructure that will help us build an ecosystem service economy
as robust as the nation's economies for natural resource commodities, commercially
manufactured products, and human-supplied services." 5
The Law and Policy of Ecosystem Services is an important book. Although it
has a distinctly American focus, its diagnosis is highly relevant to Canadian
environmental law as well. The authors, law professor J.B. Ruhl,6 agribusiness
economics professor Steven Kraft, and geography professor Christopher Lant,
address the subject of ES first through the contours of three non-law disciplines-
ecology, geography, and economics-that have already begun to map the
importance of ES to society. As the book explains, "[t]remendous advancement
has been made in the past decade toward improving our understanding of the
ecological dynamics of ecosystem services, their geographical distribution across
landscapes, and their economic value to human communities."'
4. Supra note 1 at 11.
5. Ibid. at 8.
6. Professor Ruhl is a prominent contributor to the legal literature on ecosystem services, a
subject that has received comparatively little attention. See J.B. Ruhl & R.J. Gregg,
"Integrating Ecosystem Services into Environmental Law: A Case Study of Wetlands
Mitigation Banking" (2001) 20 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 365; J.B. RuhI, "Equitable Apportionment
of Ecosystem Services: New Water Law for a New Water Age" (2003) 19 J. Land Use &
Envtl. L. 47; J.B. Ruhl, "Ecosystem Services and the Common Law of'the Fragile Land
System"' (2005) 20 Nat. Resources & Env't 3; J.B. Ruhl, "Toward a Common Law of
Ecosystem Services" (2005) 18 St. Thomas L. Rev. 1; J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman,
"Ecosystem Services and the Public Trust Doctrine: Working Change from Within" (2006)
15 Southeastern Envtl. L.J. 223; J.B. RuhI, "The 'Background Principles' of Natural Capital
and Ecosystem Services-Did Lucas Open Pandora's box? (Proceedings from the
Symposium on the Law and Policy of Ecosystem Services)" (2007) 22 J. Land Use & Envtl.
L. 525; and J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, "Thinking Inside the Box: Looking for Ecosystem
Services within a Forested Watershed (Proceedings from the Symposium on the Law and
Policy of Ecosystem Services)" (2007) 22 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 173.
7. Supra note 1 at 9.
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The book then takes on its main project: to lay out a legal framework for
addressing ES. Chapters four, five, and six, the core of the book's diagnosis,
explain the law's current failure to carry out this job. The authors effectively
describe why no pr6perty rights attach to ES, an absence "which renders them
in many applications as public good resources subject to under-provision and
over-depletion in the absence of some moderating influence."8 It is not a simple
thing to create a property right to ES, for they are not concrete things like trees
or sheep. They are not even usufructuary, like water flowing through a
property. Their point of origin may be remote from their point of delivery, and
often they do not originate from a single plot of land.
In the absence of effective common law rights, regulation is often seen as a
feasible approach to environmental problems. But in the case of ES, the authors
report that regulatory solutions have not been forthcoming. They conclude that
"[a]lthough a consensus is building that ecosystem services hold tremendous
values that we should seek to understand and incorporate into decision making
about the environment, regulatory frameworks ... for efficiently managing
ecosystem seryices have not materialized."9
IV. PRESCRIPTIONS AND CHALLENGES
A. SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX ECOLOGICAL WORLD1"
The Law and Policy of Ecosystem Services provides an excellent diagnosis of
present shortcomings in environmental law, but a less satisfying prescription for
what ought to change. What particular combination of legal principles and
instruments the authors propose is not entirely clear, but it appears to consist of
numerous initiatives that could make the governance of ES a bureaucratic and
administrative quagmire. They state that
[s]olutions for improved accounting of [the values of ecosystem services] must be
integrated with, and if necessary alter, an existing mosaic of instruments and
institutions governing property rights, regulation, and social norms .... There is no
silver bullet instrument-no elegant doctrine of property law or innovative
regulation-that will solve the Tragedy of Ecosystem Services in one fell swoop ...
8. Ibid. at 10.
9. Ibid.
10. See Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1995).
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[A]ccounting for natural capital and ecosystem services will happen, if at all, only
incrementally, through a combination of instruments, and with the concerted effort
of a wide variety of institutions.1
The authors muse about whether the law of property can adapt to better
account for natural capital and ES, but their main emphasis is regulation,
including the creation of a plethora of state and regional agencies and local
councils to develop policies and plans.
12
In taking this approach, the authors appear to be in danger of reproducing
the worst aspects of urban planning laws and plocesses."3 The last thing ES
require is a morass of procedures and politics." Ecosystems may be complex,
but their governance need not be uncertain and complicated. It may well be
that the scope of individual rights needs to be redefined in light of ecosystem
knowledge, but Ruhl, Kraft, and Lant do not emphasize this approach; instead,
they imagine a vast and complicated array of processes that will result in
discretionary decision making, 5 uncertainty, and variation from location to
location. Their strategy reflects a distinctly instrumentalist flavour-an
11. Supra note 1 at 265.
12. Ibid., c. 18 at 272-92.
13. As does the Ontario Clean Water Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 22, Parts 1I and III. The Act
requires the preparation, amendment, and review of "source protection plans," with the
participation of conservation authorities acting as source protection authorities, source
protection committees, municipal councils, and the Ministry of the Environment.
14. See e.g. Z. Plater, "Environmental Law in the Political Ecosystem - Coping with the Reality
of Politics" (2003) 19 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 423.
15. Excessive discretion plagues modern environmental law: David R. Boyd, Unnatural Law:
Rethinking Canadian Environmental Law andPolicy (Vancouver: U.B.C. Press, 2003) at 231.
Professor Ruhl, one of the authors of The Law and Policy of Ecosystem Services, is one of the
leading advocates of ecosystem management in the United States. He and I have been
debating the role of discretionary decision making in the context of ecosystem management
in a series of pieces in the Pace Environmental Law Review: B. Pardy, "Changing Nature:
The Myth of the Inevitability of Ecosystem Management" (2003) 20 Pace Envtl. L. Rev.
675; J.B. Ruhl, "The Myth of What is Inevitable Under Ecosystem Management: A
Response to Pardy" (2004) 21 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 315; B. Pardy, "Ecosystem Management
in Question: A Reply to Ruhl" (2005-2006) 23 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 209; J.B. Ruhl, "The
Pardy-Ruhl Dialogue on Ecosystem Management, Part IV: Narrowing and Sharpening the
Questions" (2007) 24 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 25; and B. Pardy, "The Pardy-Ruhl Dialogue on
Ecosystem Management Part V: Discretion, Complex-Adaptive Problem Solving and the
Rule of Law" (2008) 25 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. [forthcoming].
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inclination to use law as a tool to manipulate people, rather than to define
boundaries between interests. They write that, "in the domain of law, any
question of relationship between people is ripe for developing a set of rules and
liabilities designed to lead to desired behavioral outcomes."16 Environmental
law already suffers from too much instrumentalism and not enough principle
about the nature of the space between individuals, and between individuals and
the state. What does liberty mean in ecological terms? Where is the zone of
environmental autonomy? Does it include rights to an ecological support
.system? If Mary clears an area of her land and thus diminishes the viability of a
population of bees that pollinates her neighbour's plants, does she encroach
upon that neighbour?7 Or does her neighbour, by insisting that the bees be left
alone, encroach upon her? The book does not offer the principled answers that
these kinds of questions deserve.
B. SERVICES VERSUS SYSTEMS
Modern environmental laws are extensive and wide-ranging, but they are aimed
at the wrong targets. They govern a plethora of subjects-water takings,
forestry, endangered species, air pollution, fish stocks, pesticides, toxic
substances, waste management, and more-but they do not protect ecosystems
as systems. They are based on the erroneous premise that it is possible to
protect an element of an ecosystem without protecting the system that produces
and supports it. For example, as the name suggests, endangered species
legislation typically focuses on the endangerment of species rather than on the
decline of habitats. While under some legislative regimes listing a species as
endangered triggers some degree of protection for that species' habitat,"8 the
focus is on the population of the animal rather than on the state of the
ecosystem within which it lives. This approach is of questionable value. There is
little prospect of protecting particular species of plants or animals in isolation
from their native ecosystems, since within those systems are the means by
which the species survives. Conversely, effective protection of those systems
would also protect the species, since the species is an integral part of the system.
16: Supra note 1 at 89.
17. Ibid. at 268.
18. See e.g. the Ontario Endangered Species Act 2007, S.O. 2007, c. 6, ss. 9-15.
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The same could be said of any attempt to protect ES rather than
ecosystems themselves. The authors correctly point out that ecosystem services
are not the same thing as ecosystem functions. "The critical difference between
the two, and which makes the development of ecosystem services policy both
complicated and controversial," they explain, "is that ecosystem services have
relevance only to the extent human populations benefit from them. They are
purely anthropocentric."" Unfortunately, the authors apply this distinction to
refine their aim rather than to broaden their target. They imply that it is
possible to regulate, govern, or manage ES in isolation from the broader
objective of protecting ecosystem functions, regardless of whether they be
directly advantageous to humans or not.
Ruhl, Kraft, and Lant do not advocate business as usual. Indeed, the objective
of their project is the reverse: to find new ways to organize environmental law so as
to regulate and manage ES. In framing the issue in this way, however, they
reproduce old patterns. ES are products of ecosystems; if ecosystem function is
preserved and protected, then ES will also be sustained. While the rationale for
protecting ecosystems could well be the utilitarian or anthropocentric purpose of
maintaining ES for human benefit, the way to maintain ES is not to target those
services themselves, but to protect the system that produces them. The solution to
dwindling ES is to protect ecosystem functions.
C. PROPERTY RIGHTS
In considering whether it is possible to configure private legal rights that might
protect and preserve ES, the authors focus on property rights."0 "[Where
natural capital and the 'ecosystem services flowing from it are well defined
ecologically, geographically, and economically," they argue, "it makes sense to
think about how to configure private property rights in them in order to
facilitate their optimum allocation through the market pricing mechanism."
21
Property rights are indeed a logical place to start. Many ES arise on land that is
itself the subject of property rights, and many land-based activities, such as
agriculture, depend intensely on ES. But property rights are only one kind of
legal right, and suffer from particular restrictions. If rights to ES are tied to
19. Supra note 1 at 15 [emphasis in original].
20. Ibid. at 266.
21. Ibid. at 95.
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rights in land, for instance, does this mean that only land rights holders have
rights to ES? The need for ES is not always directly tied to the use of particular
parcels of land, and individuals without land rely on ES too. Other kinds of
legal rights protect a Wide variety of important interests: the cause of action in
battery protects encroachment upon one's person; the law of defamation
protects reputation. What kind of legal right could effectively protect an
individual's interest in ecosystem support? There are many possibilities.2
V. CONCLUSION
Incorporating ES into markets is not a simple proposition, and moreover may
treat them as things-like apples, haircuts, houses, and furnace repairs-instead
of as processes that have central roles in ecosystems. Environmental regulation
has not proven able to stem the tide of ecosystem decline. Planning processes
are poor ways to govern natural systems and fail to provide citizens with
enforceable legal rights. Environmental law is already too discretionary, too
political, and too variable from place to place and case to case. Like many
aspects of environmental law, the protection of ES needs to be reconsidered in a
principled way that does not reproduce present shortcomings.
The Law and Policy of Ecosystem Services is a welcome book and a valuable
addition to the sparse legal literature on ES. The book may help to place the
protection of ES on the agenda in environmental law. ES provide the livable,
breathable world within which traditional economic activity takes place, but are
taken for granted until they start to fail. Without legal status, they can be
expected to continue to diminish. This problem challenges traditional and
current approaches to environmental law and policy, and cannot be dealt with
by mere tweaking. As this book demonstrates, the legal governance of
ecosystem services is easier said than done.
22. For just one example, see B. Pardy, "In Search of the Holy Grail of Environmental Law: A
Rule to Solve the Problem" (2005) 1 Int'l J.S.D.L. & Pol'y 29.
